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ELENA KAGAN CAN'T SAY THAT: THE SORRY




PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
From: Ray L. Politik, Counsel to the President
Re: Proposed Statement of Elena Kagan to the U.S. Senate,
Committee on the Judiciary, on her nomination to be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
Date: June 2010
I have reviewed the draft statement that Elena Kagan has proposed
submitting to the Senate Judiciary Committee.! In this statement, Dean
Kagan seeks to educate the Judiciary Committee and the American people
to think differently about the enterprise of constitutional interpretation.
This is a highly quixotic mission with very little chance of success and
tremendous potential to do damage to you and to the judiciary. It is,
therefore, my recommendation that you urge Elena Kagan, in the strongest
terms possible, not to submit the proposed statement.2 If this effort at
persuasion fails, I recommend that you withdraw her nomination.
* Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. From 2009-2010, I worked in
the Department of Justice as Counselor to the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal
Policy. The views expressed in this Commentary do not express the views of the Department of Justice
or the administration. Moreover, nothing expressed in this Commentary reflects nonpublic or other
"inside" information.
1. Eric J. Segall, What Elena Kagan Could Have and Should Have Said (and Still Have Been
Confirmed), 88 WAsH. U. L. REv. 535 (2010).
2. I do not mean to suggest, of course, that Dean Kagan make any statement she believes to be
untrue. I do believe she can honestly make a statement such as that given by Justice Sotomayor during
her confirmation hearing:
In the past month, many Senators have asked me about my judicial philosophy. Simple:
fidelity to the law. The task of a judge is not to make law. It is to apply the law.
... That is why I generally structure my opinions by setting out what the law requires
and then explaining why a contrary position, sympathetic or not, is accepted or rejected.
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Dean Kagan proposes to declare that "the 'law' often runs out in
difficult constitutional cases. At that point, a Justice has no choice but to
bring her personal values, experiences, and judgments to the process. The
law, alone, is simply not enough to decide these cases."3 I want to make it
clear at the outset that I do not, in this memo, take issue with the substance
of this view.4 My objections are, rather, strategic. In short, Dean Kagan's
confirmation hearing is neither the time nor the place to challenge the
prevailing notion of how judges should interpret the Constitution.
The conservative legal movement' has succeeded in planting in the
minds of much of the American public the idea that there are two types of
judges: the liberal, activist judge and the conservative judge. Conservative
judges promise to interpret the Constitution according to its text and the
original understanding of that text, and without reference to values,
experience, or other considerations that are external to the Constitution's
text as originally understood.6 Liberal, activist judges, by contrast, are said
to interpret the Constitution according to their own values and experiences
in order to "do justice" in the cases they decide. The conservative
That is how I seek to strengthen both the rule of law and faith in the impartiality of our
judicial system. My personal and professional experiences help me to listen and understand,
with the law always commanding the result in every case.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 59 (2009)
(statement of Sonia Sotomayor, Nominee to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States).
3. Segall, supra note 1.
4. I also do not mean to endorse Dean Kagan's position. While I agree that the Constitution's
text is frequently indeterminate as applied to contemporary controversies, I believe that such
controversies are best resolved by reference to the values embodied within the Constitution itself,
rather than by reference to a Justice's own personal values. It is true that the Constitution encompasses
a range of values that are frequently in tension-national security and individual liberty, for example.
Yet, I believe that the best construction of constitutional meaning lies in the balancing of these
constitutional values according to accepted modes of judicial interpretation; here, I mean something
roughly like the modalities set forth in Philip Bobbitt's important book, Constitutional Fate. For an
excellent survey of these modalities as actually employed in Supreme Court constitutional
interpretation, see LACKLAND H. BLOOM, JR., METHODS OF INTERPRETATION: HOW THE SUPREME
COURT READS THE CONSTITUTION (2009). An individual Justice's personal values and life experiences
may have some relevance to the Justice's actual practice of accommodating competing and conflicting
constitutional values, but, for the reasons set forth in the balance of this memo, I believe that
discussing this topic is, at least, distracting.
5. I refer to the movement described in STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE
LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008).
6. There are, of course, many differing approaches to originalism, but these differences are of
no significance to resolving the matter at hand. I should also note that many originalists are willing to
concede that a judge must also take account of judicial precedent in construing the Constitution and
that, on occasion, precedent may require the judge to adhere to an interpretation that is at odds with
original understanding.
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approach is taken to be legitimate because it maintains the neutrality of the
interpreter and prevents the judge from imposing his or her own policy
preferences. The liberal, activist approach is understood to be illegitimate
because it releases the objective constraints (the text and original
understanding) that prevent a judge from altering the meaning of the
Constitution. Thus, liberal, activist judges are frequently derided as
"legislating from the bench."
The conservative model of what a judge is supposed to do when
interpreting the Constitution was famously stated by Chief Justice John
Roberts in his opening statement at his own confirmation hearing:
Judges and Justices are servants of the law, not the other way
around. Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules; they
apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They
make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role.
Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.
Even though this formulation had tremendous public appeal, it does not
tell us very much about what it means for a judge to call balls and strikes.
In fact, it didn't need to. That job-setting forth the substance of the
proper, nonactivist method of constitutional interpretation-had been done
already by numerous commentators. Robert Bork has written several
books since his own failed nomination to the Supreme Court explaining
the enterprise. Mark Levin, the conservative talk-show host and writer on
legal issues, sums up Bork's work thusly:
originalism "appeal[s] to a common sense of what judges' roles
ought to be in a properly functioning constitutional democracy.
Judges are not to overturn the will of legislative majorities absent a
violation of a constitutional right, as those rights were understood
by the framers. . . . Originalism seeks to promote the rule of law by
imparting to the Constitution a fixed, continuous, and predictable
meaning."8
Former Justice David Souter has recently attempted to expose the myth
at the heart of this dichotomy between conservative and activist judges. In
7. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the
United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G.
Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States).
8. MARK LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK 13 (2005) (quoting John E. Thompson, Note, What's the Big
Deal: The Unconstitutionality of God in the Pledge of Allegiance, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 563,
581 (2003)).
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his commencement address at Harvard University, he offered an
extraordinarily subtle and thoughtful critique of the judge-as-umpire
model and an equally compelling case for values-based judging. His effort
is worth an extended excerpt:
The [umpire] 9 model fails to account for what the Constitution
actually says, and it fails just as badly to understand what judges
have no choice but to do. The Constitution is a pantheon of values,
and a lot of hard cases are hard because the Constitution gives no
simple rule of decision for the cases in which one of the values is
truly at odds with another. Not even its most uncompromising and
unconditional language can resolve every potential tension of one
provision with another, tension the Constitution's Framers left to be
resolved another day; and another day after that, for our cases can
give no answers that fit all conflicts, and no resolutions [sic]
immune to rethinking when the significance of old facts may have
changed in the changing world. These are reasons enough to show
how egregiously it misses the point to think of judges in
constitutional cases as just sitting there reading constitutional
phrases fairly and looking at reported facts objectively to produce
their judgments. Judges have to choose between the good things that
the Constitution approves, and when they do, they have to choose,
not on the basis of measurement, but of meaning.
So, it is tempting to dismiss the critical rhetoric of lawmaking
and activism as simply a rejection of too many of the hopes we
profess to share as the American people. But there is one thing
more. I have to believe that something deeper is involved, and that
behind most dreams of a simpler Constitution there lies a basic
human hunger for the certainty and control that the [umpire] model
seems to promise.
9. Justice Souter uses the phrase "fair reading model" to refer to the judge-as-umpire approach.
I believe that is a more accurate description even than originalism. Justice Scalia's important
articulation of the model makes it clear that his method is actually best described as textualism rather
than originalism, which is consistent with Justice Souter's label. See ANTONIN ScAHA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE LAW (1997). Nevertheless, the tag "originalism" has
taken hold in public discourse, and even Justice Scalia does not attempt to revise this.
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But I have come to understand ... that I differ from the critics
I've described .... Where I suspect we differ most fundamentally is
in my belief that in an indeterminate world I cannot control, it is
still possible to live fully in the trust that a way will be found
leading through the uncertain future. And to me, the future of the
Constitution as the Framers wrote it can be staked only upon that
same trust.10
This is nearly identical to the argument Dean Kagan proposes to make
in her draft statement. While the publicity of Justice Souter's speech did
not approach the publicity attending a Supreme Court confirmation
hearing, the speech was very widely publicized. The reaction to Justice
Souter's speech is not an encouraging precedent for Dean Kagan's
proposal. For example, the Boston Globe's story covering the speech was
headlined, "Souter Defends Judicial Activism; Says Perspectives Change
with Time.""
Justice Stephen Breyer has just published a book, Making Our
Democracy Work, which follows his 2005 book, Active Liberty, and
continues his project of explaining and justifying the role of the judiciary
in our constitutional system. The review published in The New York
Times, by a former aide to President Clinton who is sympathetic to
Breyer's project, notes that the book arrives "at a time when legal thinkers
on the left are struggling to develop a jurisprudence with anything like the
clarity (or, rather, the certainty) of that on the right." 12
Perhaps most directly on point, you have nominated Professor
Goodwin Liu to be a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. Professor Liu is exceptionally well qualified and has a
compelling life story. Senate Republicans, however, have been blocking
his nomination on the grounds that he will be an activist. Their evidence?
A book1 3  he co-wrote espousing an approach to constitutional
interpretation that conservatives claim is not originalist. 14 The views that
10. Justice David H. Souter, Text of Justice Souter's Speech: Harvard Commencement Remarks
(As Delivered), HARvARD GAZETTE, May 27, 2010, http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/05/
text-of-justice-david-souters-speech/.
11. Jonathan Saltzman, Souter Defends Judicial Activism; Says Perspectives Change with Time,
Bos. GLOBE, May 28, 2010, at 4, available at www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/
2010/05/28/souter defends judicial activism/. Of course, Justice Souter said nothing of the sort.
12. Jeff Shesol, Evolving Circumstances, Enduring Values, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, at BR14,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/19/books/review/Shesol-t.htnl.
13. GOODWIN LIU, PAMELA S. KARLAN & CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, KEEPING FAITH WITH
THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
14. See, e.g., Shannon Bream, Obama 9th Circuit Nominee: Constitution Must Adapt to Changes
in the World, FOXNEWS.COM, Mar. 4, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/03/04/obama-th-
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Liu and his coauthors set forth are similar to those expressed by Justices
Souter and Breyer and, if anything, milder than those in Dean Kagan's
draft statement. Predictably, Republicans claim that "Liu believes that
judges have the authority to impose their views . . . using clever verbal
camouflage to disguise what they're doing."15 Professor Liu's nomination
remains stalled and was returned to the White House without action at the
Senate's last recess.
These examples, chosen from among legions available, demonstrate
that the conservatives have succeeded in defining the debate: a judge is
either a judicial activist or a conservative. If Dean Kagan gives the
proposed remarks, she will clearly brand herself a judicial activist, just as
Justice Souter did in his Harvard commencement address. This will open
her to demagoguery by conservatives on the Judiciary Committee and by
right-wing media commentators and bloggers. This, in turn, will seriously
jeopardize her prospects for confirmation.
Dean Kagan is, I believe, well aware of this common misconception
regarding 'judicial activism." Her proposal, then, seems bottomed on the
perception that her confirmation hearing could provide a "teachable
moment," after which the public understanding of constitutional
interpretation will change in some important respect. Even though Dean
Kagan is a magnificent teacher, this project is doomed to fail because
confirmation hearings are not teachable moments.
I know you are familiar with the confirmation battle waged over the
nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court. Tremendous attention-
I would say unprecedented attention-was given to his theory of
constitutional interpretation and its potential consequences for the country.
If ever a Supreme Court nomination provided the nation a teachable
moment, it was Robert Bork's. After this full airing of views, Judge
Bork's nomination was rejected by a bipartisan vote. The lesson of this
teachable moment should have been that originalism is not a credible
method of constitutional interpretation. Yet, the lure of originalism and its
false promise of objective, neutral judging has grown stronger since that
event.
Public understanding of the Constitution's meaning and the role of
interpretation forms gradually over time, rather than in a galvanizing
circuit-nominee-constitution-adapt-changes-world/ (noting that opposition to his writings focuses on
his book on constitutional interpretation).
15. Id. (quoting Ed Whelan, a leading conservative pundit on legal issues and president of the
Ethics and Public Policy Center).
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teachable moment. As an example, take Brown v. Board of Education.16
Brown itself was the culmination of decades of strategizing by Charles
Hamilton Houston, the NAACP, and other thinkers and organizations,
carried into execution by Thurgood Marshall and a team of lawyers in a
painstaking series of cases designed to pave the way for the overruling of
Plessy v. Ferguson's" doctrine of "separate but equal." Once decided,
Brown actually did little to engender racial equality,18 but it provided
strong moral and rhetorical force for the civil rights movement. It enabled
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., to declare, "If we are wrong, then the
Supreme Court of this Nation is wrong. If we are wrong, the Constitution
of the United States is wrong. If we are wrong, God Almighty is wrong." 19
It was another decade before Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to establish the principle of
nondiscrimination in American law.
More to the point, the conservative legal movement that has convinced
the public that its method of interpretation is legitimate and that other
methods are activist did not succeed overnight. Rather, it had its roots in
the opposition to Brown, which gave rise to the Southern strategy of
Richard Nixon, including his railing against liberal, activist judges. The
movement was later advanced through the founding and impressive work
of the Federalist Society and the broad network of conservative legal
scholars and practitioners that it fostered.2 0 When John Roberts pitched his
umpire metaphor, it represented a culmination, rather than an origination,
for the conservative legal movement. As noted above, the umpire
metaphor was forceful, not because then-Judge Roberts used his hearing as
a teachable moment, but because of the tremendous amount of prior spade
work that had been done to make the public receptive to his sloganeering.
We have no similar public support, nor do we have a significant
constituency that demands that we seek to promote a progressive legal
agenda. Consider two contrasting examples. The Heritage Foundation, in
2005, published Mandate for Leadership, which conservatives hoped
would be a blueprint for George W. Bush's second term. Former attorney
general Edwin Meese coauthored a chapter entitled, "Restoring the Proper
16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
17. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
18. See generally GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008).
19. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Speech at the Holt Street Baptist Church (Dec. 5, 1955),
available at http://www.blackvoices.com/black news/canvas directoryheadlines features/feature
article?id=20060111182609990001.
20. For an outstanding exploration of this phenomenon, see TELES, supra note 5.
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Role of the Courts." In this chapter, he asserted that the rule of law means
that "the U.S. Constitution and laws are supreme and have fixed, objective
meanings . . . . The Constitution is very much alive and relevant to
protecting our freedoms today, but it does not vary in its meaning or
protections depending on the fashionable trends or notions of any era." 2 1
After setting forth this "principle," Mr. Meese sets out the operational
objective to carry this principle into effect: "Nominate and confirm to
federal courts only individuals who have a proven record of fidelity to the
Constitution, the rule of law, and the proper role of a federal judge."22 He
goes on to explain this objective:
The President and Senators should conduct a careful inquiry into a
potential federal judge's judicial philosophy, or the methodology he
would use when deciding cases. It is not enough for a nominee
simply to pledge to follow the rule of law without explaining what
that means. A record of scholarship, prior opinions, or a discussion
of important constitutional provisions should be pursued to
determine whether the nominee appreciates what the rule of law
requires, which includes a commitment to interpret and apply the
Constitution and laws as they were written and were originally
intended to operate.23
In 2008, by contrast, the Center for American Progress-the
progressive version of the Heritage Foundation-published a book that
was intended as a blueprint for the next presidential term.24 It did not
include an entry on judicial appointments or the role of the judiciary. This
was not an oversight.25 Rather, it reflects the absence of a significant
constituency demanding a progressive approach to constitutional issues.
Until such a constituency forms, it would be foolish to spend political
capital on a Supreme Court nomination fight. In the absence of such a
21. Edwin Meese III & Todd F. Gaziano, Restoring the Proper Role of the Courts, in HERITAGE
FOUNDATION, MANDATE FOR LEADERSHIP: PRINCIPLES TO LIMIT GOVERNMENT, EXPAND FREEDOM,
AND STRENGTHEN AMERICA 17, 18 (2005).
22. Id. at 19.
23. Id.
24. See CHANGE FOR AMERICA: A PROGRESSIVE BLUEPRINT FOR THE 44TH PRESIDENT (Mark
Green & Michelle Jolin eds., 2008).
25. The Center for American Progress published a paper on judicial appointments on its website
along with papers on a variety of other subjects that did not make the cut for inclusion in the published
book. See SIMON LAZARUS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND, JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS:
IMPLEMENTING THE RULE OF LAW (2005), http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2008/change
foramerica/pdf'udiciall.pdf.
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constituency, a Supreme Court confirmation battle will yield no benefit to
your administration.
Finally, allowing Dean Kagan to proceed with her draft statement
would be contrary to the consistent policy of this administration.26 To date,
we have refused to spend any political capital on judicial nominees, or any
other nominees for that matter. The reason for this policy is simple: this
administration has too many important matters to contend with to be
distracted by personnel matters. Indeed, spending political capital on
nominations diminishes the store of capital available for this
administration to pursue the historically important reforms that you were
elected to achieve. The list, as you know better than anyone, is extensive.
The highlights include reforming health care, enacting an economic
stimulus to respond to the gravest economic crisis in seventy years,
reforming the banking and financial sector, responding to climate change,
fighting the war on terror, prosecuting two wars simultaneously,
responding to the perceived immigration crisis, containing the oil leak in
the Gulf of Mexico, and promoting energy security.
These problems demand near-term action, and the American people
elected you to provide leadership in resolving them; they did not elect you
to supply them with the breads and circuses of the culture wars. This is
why we immediately retreated from using the term "empathy" when doing
so became so controversial in the context of the last Supreme Court
nomination, that of Justice Sonia Sotomayor.27 Even if Dean Kagan is
26. Author's note: I have gleaned the administration's policy from its actions and not from any
information gained while I was in government service.
27. For an example of the backlash that the use of this word generated, see Karl Rove,
"Empathy" Is Code for Judicial Activism, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2009, at A13, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124347199490860831.html. Each of the Republican senators on the
Judiciary Committee took issue with the legitimacy of employing empathy in judging during his
opening remarks on the confirmation hearing of Justice Sotomayor. The comments of the Ranking
Member, Senator Sessions, are emblematic:
I have to say, as a result of President Obama's views that, in tough cases, the critical
ingredient for ajudge is the "depth and breadth of one's empathy," as well as, his word, "their
broader vision of what America should be."
Like the American people, I have watched this process for a number of years, and I fear
that this "empathy standard" is another step down the road to a liberal activist, results-
oriented, and relativistic world where laws lose their fixed meaning, unelected judges set
policy, Americans are seen as members of separate groups rather than as simply Americans,
and where the constitutional limits on Government power are ignored when politicians want
to buy out private companies. So we have reached a fork in the road, I think, and there are
stark differences.
I want to be clear:
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willing to supply her cause (a cause that does not appear to have many
followers) with a martyr on the example of Robert Bork, your agenda is
too important to allow her to do so.
I do not wish to suggest that you simply cede the battle to the
conservatives. Instead, I suggest that you begin to explore ways that your
administration might begin to promote the sort of grassroots constituency
that is an indispensable precondition for creating a progressive
constitutional agenda. There are groups, such as the American
Constitution Society and the Alliance for Justice, that are actively engaged
in these issues. They do excellent work, but there may be ways that we can
help them. If so, this could prove to be an important part of your legacy as
President.
I will not vote for-and no senator should vote for-an individual nominated by any
President who is not fully committed to fairness and impartiality toward every person who
appears before them.
I will not vote for-and no Senator should vote for-an individual nominated by any
President who believes it is acceptable for a judge to allow their personal background, gender,
prejudices, or sympathies to sway their decision in favor of, or against, parties before the
court.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 6-7 (2009)
(statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
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